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A non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form
links with others based on the cost of the link and its assessed beneﬁt. Link
formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents with-
out their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate
investment. Information ﬂow is two-way. The model builds on the work of
Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity. Whereas they permit
links to fail with a certain common probability, in our model the probability
of failure can be diﬀerent for diﬀerent links. We investigate Nash networks
that exhibit connectedness and super-connectedness. An explicit character-
ization of certain star networks is provided. Eﬃciency, Pareto-optimality,
and existence issues are discussed through examples. We explore four alter-
native model speciﬁcations to address potential shortcomings.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D82, D831 Introduction
The Internet provides ample testimony to the fact that information dis-
semination aﬀects all aspects of economic activity. It is creating global-
ization that has hitherto been unprecedented in human history. Nowadays
fashions and fads emerging in one country are easily communicated across
the world with almost no time lag. Financial troubles in one country now
have devastating consequences for other economies as the contagion moves
across boundaries with relative ease. Yet, the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis
also demonstrated that economies where information networks were rela-
tively primitive remained largely insulated from the crisis. This indicates
that both the structure and the technology of information dispersion are
important determinants of its consequences.
In the present paper, we look at the formation of social networks which
serve as a mechanism for information transmission. The structural aspects
of information dissemination are modelled by means of a social network. The
role of technology is studied by examining the reliability of the network. So-
cial networks have played a vital role in the diﬀusion of information across
society in settings as diverse as referral networks for jobs (Granovetter (1974)
and Loury (1977)) and in assessing quality of products ranging from cars to
computers (Rogers and Kincaid (1981)). Information in most societies can
either be obtained in the market-place or through a non-market environment
like a social network. For instance, in developed countries credit agencies
provide credit ratings for borrowers, while in many developing countries
credit worthiness is assessed through a social network organized along eth-
nic lines.
Agents in our model are endowed with some information which can be
accessed by other agents forming links with them. Link formation is costly
and links transmit information randomly. More precisely, agents in our
model can form links and participate in a network by incurring a cost for
each link, which may be interpreted in terms of time, money or eﬀort. The
cost of establishing a link is incurred only by the agent who initiates it, and
the initiating agent has access to the other agent’s information with a cer-
tain probability. In addition, he has access to the information from all the
links of the other agent. Thus each link can generate substantial positive
externalities of a non-rival nature in the network. Moreover, the ﬂow of
beneﬁts through a link occurs both ways. It can diﬀer across agents, since
the strength of ties varies across agents (although all links cost the same)
1so that links fail with possibly diﬀerent probabilities. This reﬂects the fact
that in reality, communication often embodies a degree of costly uncertainty.
We frequently have to ask someone to reiterate what they tell us, explain it
again and even seek second opinions.
Foreign immigrants often form such networks. When an immigrant lands
on the shores of a foreign country he usually has a list of people from the
home country to get in touch with. Once contacted, some compatriots are
more helpful than others. Often a substantial information exchange takes
place in this process, where the new arrival learns about the foreign country,
while providing the established immigrants current information about the
home country and an opportunity to indulge in nostalgia.
Bala and Goyal (2000a, b) suggest telephone calls as an example of such
networks. Another example of this kind (especially of the star networks
considered here) is a LISTSERVE or an e-mail system. Costs have to be
incurred in setting up and joining such electronic networks, but being a part
of the network does not automatically ensure access to the information of
other agents. Member participation rates in an electronic network often
vary, and messages may get lost as in the celebrated “e-mail game” (Rubin-
stein, (1989)).1
Motivated by these examples, we, like Bala and Goyal (2000a, b) develop
a non-cooperative model of network formation which generalizes theirs. The
non-cooperative game formulation of network formation models typiﬁes one
of three strands of literature of major concern to us. The two other strands
that have recently emerged in the context of economics and game theory
are diﬀerentiated by their use of cooperative game theory and the notion of
pairwise stability, repectively. The early cooperative literature treats costs
as a set of constraints on coalition formation (see for example, Myerson
(1977), Kalai et al. (1978) and Gilles et al. (1994)). An excellent survey
of that literature can be found in van den Nouweland (1993), and Borm,
van den Nouweland and Tijs (1994). Aumann and Myerson (1988) were
the ﬁrst to incorporate both costs and beneﬁts of coalition formation. This
line of research has been extended by Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000).
1Like most of the network literature we shall preclude the possibility of harmful infor-
mation, like nuisance phone calls. The same is assumed for intermediate agents or indirect
links in a network who function as purveyors of information between other agents without
incurring any disutility.
2Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced the concept of pairwise sta-
bility (known from the matching literature) as an equilibrium concept in
models of network formation. This gave rise to a completely new strand of
the literature focusing on the tension between stability and eﬃciency. Pair-
wise stability requires mutual consent of a pair of agents for link formation
whereas links can be deleted unilaterally. Dutta and Muttuswami (1997)
and Watts (2001) reﬁne the Jackson-Wolinksy framework further by intro-
ducing other stability concepts and derive implementation results for these
concepts. Johnson and Gilles (2000) introduce a geographic dimension to
the Jackson-Wolinsky model through spatial costs of link formation. For a
recent survey of this literature see Jackson (2003).
Several dynamic models using pairwise stability have been investigated
as well, starting with Jackson and Watts (2002a). Jackson and Watts
(2002b) and Goyal and Vega-Rodondo (1999) consider coordination games
played on a network. The choice of partners in the game is endogenous and
players are periodically allowed to add or sever links. Droste et al. (2000)
also analyze coordination games played on a network — with spatial costs
of link formation.
The non-cooperative version of network formation has ﬁrst been devel-
oped in two papers by Bala and Goyal (2000a, b). In all cases, agents choose
to form links on the basis of costs and a (deterministic or stochastic) ﬂow
of beneﬁts that accrue from links. Bala and Goyal assume that a player
can create a one-sided link with another player by making the appropriate
investment. Their assumption diﬀers fundamentally from the concept of
pairwise stability since mutual consent of both players is no longer required
for link formation. They further investigate the reliability issue in networks
by allowing links to fail independently of each other with a certain probabil-
ity. Links are deterministic in Bala and Goyal (2000a). They are random,
with identical probabilities of failure for all established links, in Bala and
Goyal (2000b). Thus both their models deal with homogeneous agents. The
corresponding static equilibrium outcomes are called Nash networks.2
Our model also belongs to the non-cooperative tradition and is a gen-
eralization of Bala and Goyal (2000b). We introduce agent heterogeneity
by allowing for the probability of link failure (or success) to diﬀer across
2They also identify strict Nash networks and study the formation of Nash networks in
a modiﬁed version of best-response dynamics.
3links. This distinctive feature reﬂects the nature of the transmission tech-
nology or the quality of information. The generalization provides a richer
model in terms of answering theoretical as well as practical questions: con-
nectivity and super-connectivity, selection of central agents in star networks,
eﬃciency, and Pareto-optimality. Besides imparting greater realism to the
model, the introduction of heterogeneous agents allows us to check the ro-
bustness of the conclusions obtained in Bala and Goyal (2000b). Whereas
their ﬁndings still hold under certain conditions, heterogeneity gives rise to
a greater variety of equilibrium outcomes, tends to alter results signiﬁcantly
and even generates some of the results of their deterministic model.
Bala and Goyal show for both their models that Nash networks must
be either connected or empty. With heterogeneous agents, this proves true
only when the probabilities of success are not very diﬀerent from each other.
Another central ﬁnding of Bala and Goyal is that compared to information
decay imperfect reliability has very diﬀerent eﬀects on network formation.
With information decay, minimally connected networks (notably the star)
are Nash for a wide range of cost and decay parameters, independently
of the size of society. In contrast, with imperfect reliability and small link
formation costs, minimally connected networks tend to be replaced by super-
connected networks (connected networks with redundant links) as the player
set increases. However, with agent heterogeneity neither connectedness nor
super-connectedness need arise asymptotically. Furthermore, in order for
star networks to be Nash, probabilities must lie in a certain range (depend-
ing on costs) as in Bala and Goyal’s setting. But we ﬁnd that as a rule,
they have to satisfy additional conditions. In particular, it never pays in
the Bala and Goyal framework to connect to the center of the star indi-
rectly. In our context, however, such a connection might be beneﬁcial and
further conditions on probabilities are required to prevent these connections.
Interestingly enough, heterogeneity helps resolve a particular ambiguity as-
sociated with the homogeneous model: Owing to the additional equilibrium
conditions, the coordination problem inherent in selecting the central agent
of a star is mitigated to a certain degree.
We also investigate eﬃciency issues and ﬁnd that Nash networks may
be nested and Pareto-ranked. We demonstrate by example that ineﬃcient
Nash networks can be Pareto-optimal. A further example shows that Nash
networks do not always exist with non-uniform link success probabilities.
Criticisms of the non-cooperative approach to network formation are ad-
dressed as well. We extend the model to allow for duplication of links
4and to analyze Nash networks with incomplete information. Regarding the
ﬁrst extension, it turns out that double links enable the formation of some
networks that could not occur in the single links model. In the second ex-
tension, we ﬁnd that redundant links will be established when the agents
beliefs about the probabilities of the indirect links are lower than the actual
probabilities. Finally, the implications of mutual consent and endogenous
success probabilities for Nash networks are discussed and explored.
The network literature almost completely lacks models with heteroge-
neous agents, with the notable exception of Johnson and Gilles (2000) and
Droste et al. (2000) who introduce spatial heterogeneity of agents and ob-
tain results substantially diﬀerent from both static and dynamic versions of
homogeneous-agent pairwise stability models. Their model and ours diﬀer
in two respects: the kind of agent heterogeneity and the equilibrium con-
cept. They follow Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and use pairwise stability
as the equilibrium concept. We analyze Nash networks. In a recent paper,
Galeotti and Goyal (2002) also incorporate heterogeneity in the context of
Nash networks. In their model diﬀerent links may have diﬀerent costs, and
the beneﬁts of obtaining information from other players also varies across
agents. They ﬁnd that equilibrium networks continue to have some of the
key features identiﬁed by Bala and Goyal (2000a), i.e., centrality, center-
sponsorship and short network diameter occur in equilibrium despite the
presence of heterogeneous players.3 These properties depend on the fact
that links are fully reliable.
In Section 2, we introduce the basic notation and terminology used
throughout the paper. In Section 3, we present some general results and
observations on Nash networks. Alternative formulations of the model are
considered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Section 6 contains proofs and
derivations.
2 The Model
Let N = {1,...,n} denote the set of agents, with generic members i and
j. For ordered pairs (i,j) ∈ N × N, the shorthand notation ij is used. For
non-ordered pairs {i,j}, the notation [ij] is used. The symbol ⊂ for set
inclusion permits equality. We assume throughout that n ≥ 3. Each agent
3However, some novel and somewhat unexpected Nash network architectures are ob-
served, for instance collections of stars.
5has some information of value to the other agents. An agent can get access
to more information by forming links with other agents. Agents form their
links simultaneously. The formation of links is costly. Each link denotes a
connection between a pair of agents which is not fully reliable. It may fail to
transmit information with a positive probability that can diﬀer across links.
Each agent’s strategy is a vector gi = (gi1,...,gii−1,gii+1,...,gin) where
i ∈ N and gij ∈ {0,1} for each j ∈ N\{i}. The value gij = 1 means that
agents i and j have a link initiated by i whereas gij = 0 means that agent i
does not initiate the link. This does not preclude the possibility of agent j
initiating a link with i. A link between agents i and j potentially allows for
two-way (symmetric) ﬂow of information. The set of all pure strategies
of agent i is denoted by Gi. We focus only on pure strategies in this paper.
Given that agent i has the option of forming or not forming a link with each
of the remaining n − 1 agents, the number of strategies available to agent i
is |Gi| = 2n−1. The strategy space of all agents is given by G = G1×···×Gn.
A strategy proﬁle g = (g1,...,gn) can be represented as a directed graph
or network. Notice that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
set of all directed networks with n vertices or nodes and the set of strategies
G. The link gij will be represented pictorially by an edge starting at j with
the arrowhead pointing towards i to indicate that agent i has initiated the
link. The reader may refer to Figure 2 below where agents 1 and 2 establish
the links with agent 6 and agents 3 and 4 establish the links with agent 7.
Consequently, the cost of forming these links are borne by agents 1, 2, 3 and
4 and the arrowhead always points towards the agent who pays for the link.
To describe information ﬂows in the network, let for i ∈ N and g ∈ G,
µd
i(gi) = |{k ∈ N : gik = 1}| denote the number of links in g initiated by i
which is used in the determination of i’s costs. Next we deﬁne the closure
of g which is instrumental for computing beneﬁts, since we are concerned
with the symmetric, two-way ﬂow of beneﬁts. Pictorially the closure of a
network is equivalent to replacing each directed edge of g by a non-directed
one.
Deﬁnition 1 The closure of g is a non-directed network denoted by h =
cl(g) and deﬁned as cl(g) = {ij ∈ N × N : i 6= j and gij = 1 or gji = 1}.
Beneﬁts. The beneﬁts from network g are derived from its closure
h = cl(g). For two agents i 6= j, the non-ordered pair [ij] represents the
undirected or both-way link between i and j, i.e. the simultaneous occur-
rence of ij and ji. If hij = hij = 1, then [ij] succeeds with probability
6pij ∈ (0,1) and fails with probability 1 − pij where pij is not necessarily
equal to pik for j 6= k. It is assumed, however, that pij = pji. Furthermore,
the success or failure of direct links between diﬀerent pairs of agents are
assumed to be independent events. Thus, h may be regarded as a random
network with possibly diﬀerent probabilities of realization for diﬀerent edges.
We call a non-directed network h0 a realization of h (denoted by h0 ⊂ h) if
it satisﬁes h0
ij ≤ hij for all i,j with i 6= j. The notation [ij] ∈ h0 signiﬁes
that the undirected link [ij] belongs to h0, that is h0
ij = h0
ji = 1.
At this point the concept of a path (in h0) between two agents proves
useful.
Deﬁnition 2 For h0 ⊂ h, a path of length m from an agent i to a diﬀerent
agent j is a ﬁnite sequence i0,i1,...,im of pairwise distinct agents such that
i0 = i, im = j, and h
0
ikik+1 = 1 for k = 0,...,m − 1. We say that player i
observes player j in the realization h0, if there exists a path from i to j in
h0.
Invoking the assumption of independence, the probability of the network
h0 being realized given h is





Let µi(h0) be the number of players that agent i observes in the realiza-
tion h0, i.e. the number of players to whom i is directly or indirectly linked
in h0. Each observed agent in a realization yields a beneﬁt V > 0 to agent
i. Without loss of generality assume that V = 1.
Given the strategy tuple g agent i’s expected beneﬁt from the random




where h = cl(g). The probability that network h0 is realized is λ(h0 | h), in
which case agent i gets access to the information of µi(h0) agents in total.
Note that the beneﬁt function is clearly non-decreasing in the number of
links for all the agents.
Payoﬀs. We assume that each link formed by agent i costs c > 0. Agent
i’s expected payoﬀ from the strategy tuple g is
Πi(g) = Bi(cl(g)) − µd
i(gi)c. (1)
Given a network g ∈ G, let g−i denote the network that remains when all
of agent i’s links have been removed. Clearly g = gi ⊕g−i where the symbol
7⊕ indicates that g is formed by the union of links in gi and g−i.
Deﬁnition 3 A strategy gi is said to be a best response of agent i to g−i
if
Πi(gi ⊕ g−i) ≥ Πi(g0
i ⊕ g−i) for all g0
i ∈ Gi.
Let BRi(g−i) denote the set of agent i’s best responses to g−i. A network
g = (g1,...,gn) is said to be a Nash network if gi ∈ BRi(g−i) for each
i, i.e., agents are playing a Nash equilibrium. A strict Nash network is one
where agents are playing strict best responses.
Agent i’s beneﬁt from the direct link ij to agent j is at most pij(n−1).
Set p0 = p0(c,n) = c · (n − 1)−1. If pij < p0, it never beneﬁts agent i to
initiate a link from i to j, no matter how reliably agent j is linked to other
agents and, therefore, gij = 0 in any Nash equilibrium g.
We now introduce some additional deﬁnitions which are of a more graph-
theoretic nature. A network g is said to be connected if there is a path in
h = cl(g), between any two agents i and j. A connected network g is said to
be super-connected, if there exist links after whose deletion the network
is still connected.4 A connected network g is minimally connected, if it
is no longer connected after the deletion of any link. A network g is called
complete, if all links exist in cl(g). A network with no links is called an
empty network.
Deﬁnition 4 A set C ⊂ N is called a component of g if there exists a
path in cl(g) between any two agents i and j in C and there is no strict
superset C0 of C for which this holds true.
The commonly used welfare measure is deﬁned as the sum of the payoﬀs




Πi(g) for g ∈ G.
Deﬁnition 5 A network g is eﬃcient if W(g) ≥ W(g0) for all g0 ∈ G.
4Bala and Goyal (2000b) call a network super-connected if it remains connected after
the deletion of an arbitrary single link.
8An eﬃcient network is one that maximizes the total value of information
available to all agents net of the aggregate costs of forming the links. The
deﬁnition of (strong) Pareto-optimality is the usual one: A network g is
Pareto-optimal, if there does not exist another network g0 such that Πi(g0) ≥
Πi(g) for all i and Πi(g0) > Πi(g) for some i. Obviously, every eﬃcient
network is Pareto-optimal. However, we will show that not every Pareto-
optimal network is eﬃcient. In fact, we provide an example of a Pareto-
optimal Nash network which is ineﬃcient, while the unique eﬃcient network
is not Nash.
We ﬁnally introduce the notion of an essential network. A network g ∈ G
is essential if gij = 1 implies gji = 0. Note that if c > 0 and g ∈ G is a
Nash network or an eﬃcient network, then it must be essential. This follows
from the fact that the information ﬂow is two-way and independent of which
agent invests in forming the link, that is hij = max{gij,gji}. If gij = 1, then
by the deﬁnition of Πj agent j pays an additional cost c for setting gji = 1,
while neither he nor anyone else gets any beneﬁt from it. Hence if g is not
essential it cannot be Nash or eﬃcient.
3 Nash Networks
In this section we look at Nash networks. We begin with an analysis of con-
nectedness and redundancy in Nash networks. Then we identify conditions
under which complete networks and the empty network, respectively, will
be Nash. This is followed by a subsection that covers the popular star net-
works. We also discuss eﬃciency issues by means of examples and existence
by way of a counter-example.
3.1 Connectivity and Super-Connectivity
With homogeneous agents, Nash networks are either connected or empty
(Bala and Goyal (2000b)). With heterogeneous agents, this dichotomy does
not always hold. The proposition below identiﬁes conditions under which
Nash networks will exhibit this property.
Proposition 1: If pij ≥ 1
1+c/n2 pmk for any i 6= j and m 6= k, then
every Nash network is either empty or connected.
Proof: Consider a Nash network g. Suppose g is neither empty nor
connected. Then there exist three agents i, j, and k such that i and j
9belong to one connected component of cl(g), C1 and k belongs to a diﬀerent
connected component of cl(g), C2. Then gij = 1 or gji = 1, whereas gmk =
gkm = 0 for all m ∈ C1. Without loss of generality assume gij = 1. Then
the incremental beneﬁt to i of having the link from i to j is b1 ≥ c. Let
g0 denote the network which one obtains, if in g all direct links with i as
a vertex are severed. The incremental expected beneﬁt to i of forming the
link ij in g0 is b2 ≥ b1 ≥ c and can be written as b2 = pij(1 + Vj) where Vj
is j’s expected beneﬁt from all the links j has in addition to ij.
Now consider a link from k to j, given g0 ⊕ gij. This link is worth
b3 = pkj(pij + 1 + Vj) to k. A link from k to j, given g, is worth b4 ≥ b3 to
k. We claim that b3 > b2, i.e.,
pkj > pij
1 + Vj
1 + Vj + pij







1 + n − 1
1 + n − 1 + pij
≥ pij
1 + Vj
1 + Vj + pij
where we use the fact that Vj is bounded above by n − 1. This shows the
claim that b4 ≥ b3 > b2 ≥ b1 ≥ c. Initiating the link kj is better for k than
not initiating it, contradicting that g is Nash. Hence to the contrary, g has
to be either empty or connected.
This result means that if the probabilities are not too widely dispersed,
then the empty versus connected dichotomy still holds. If, however, the
probabilities are widely dispersed, then a host of possibilities can arise and
a single dichotomous characterization is no longer adequate.
Bala and Goyal (2000b) further show that with homogeneous agents and
imperfect reliability, Nash networks become super-connected as the size of
the society increases. This result warrants several qualiﬁcations. The ﬁrst
one concerns an obvious trade-oﬀ even in the case of homogeneous agents.
While it is correct that for any given probability of success p > 0, super-
connectivity obtains asymptotically, the minimum number of players it takes
to get super-connectivity goes to inﬁnity as p goes to zero. Let n∗ be any
number of agents. If p < p0(c,n∗), then it takes at least n∗ + 1 agents to
obtain even a connected Nash network.
10Secondly, in our model with heterogeneous agents, asymptotic connec-
tivity need no longer obtain, eliminating any scope for super-connectivity.
Consider an inﬁnite sequence of agents i = 1,2,...,n,... and a sequence of
probabilities p2,p3,... such that pij = pji = pj for i < j. Then the sequence
pk,k ≥ 2, can be constructed in such a way that the empty network is the
only Nash network for any agent set In = {1,...,n}, n ≥ 2. Of course, with
heterogeneous agents, asymptotic super-connectivity obtains, if there exist
q0 and q1 such that 0 < q0 ≤ pij ≤ q1 < 1 for all ij. The argument for
homogeneous agents can easily be adapted to this case.
Finally, the lack of a common positive lower bound for the success proba-
bilities does not necessarily rule out asymptotic super-connectivity, provided
the probabilities do not drop too fast. A positive example is given by c = 1
and pij = pji = pj = j−1/2 for i < j. Basically, the argument developed for
homogeneous agents can be applied here, too. This follows from the fact







m = 2((n + 1)1/2 − m1/2).
Furthermore, with heterogeneous agents, other possibilities exist as well.
For instance, super-connectivity may be established at some point, but con-
nectivity may break down when further agents are added and reemerge
later, etc. Or possibly several connected components persist with super-
connectivity within each component. Thus the Bala and Goyal result is
altered signiﬁcantly in our model.
3.2 The Polar Cases
The next proposition identiﬁes conditions under which the complete network
and the empty network are Nash. Let P = [pij] denote the matrix of link
success probabilities for all agents (i,j) ∈ N × N, where pij ∈ (0,1).
Proposition 2: For any P, there exists c(P) > 0 such that each es-
sential complete network is (strict) Nash for all c ∈ (0,c(P)). The empty
network is strict Nash for c > max{pij}.
Proof: Let g = gi⊕g−i be any essential complete network. Consider an




ij ≤ gij for all j 6= i}. Clearly, if c = 0 then for agent i, gi is a strict
best response in G0
i against g−i. By continuity, there exists ci(P,g−i) > 0 so
11that gi is a strict best response in G0
i against g−i for all c ∈ (0,ci(P,g−i)).
Suppose c ∈ (0,ci(P,g−i)). If g∗
i ∈ Gi\G0
i, then g∗
ij = gji = 1 for some j 6= i
and there exists a better response g0
i ∈ G0
i without redundant costly links.
Since gi is at least as good a response as g0
i, it is also a better response than
g∗
i . Hence for c ∈ (0,ci(P,g−i)), gi is a strict best response in Gi against g−i.
Now let c(P) be the minimum of ci(P,g−i) over all conceivable combinations
of i and g−i. The ﬁrst part of the claim follows from this.
For the second part, if c > max{pij} and no other agent forms a link,
then it will not be worthwhile for agent i to form a link. Hence the empty
network is strict Nash as asserted.
3.3 Star Networks
Star networks are among the most widely studied network architectures.
They are characterized by one agent who is at the center of the network and
the property that the other players can only access each other through the
central agent. There are three possible types of star networks. The inward
pointing (center-sponsored) star has one central agent who establishes links
to all other agents and incurs the cost of the entire network. An outward
pointing (periphery-sponsored) star has a central agent with whom all the
other n−1 players form links. A mixed star is a combination of the inward
and outward pointing stars. Here we will focus on the periphery-sponsored








FIGURE 1: Outward Pointing (Periphery-Sposored) Star Network
12While the method of computing Nash networks does not change with the
introduction of heterogeneous agents, the process of identifying the diﬀerent
parameter ranges for Nash networks is now considerably more complicated.
We will next establish two claims about Nash networks to illustrate the
complex nature of the situation with agent heterogeneity. Without loss of
generality we will assume that player n is the central agent in the star.
Deﬁne M to be the set of all the agents except n or M = N\{n} and let
Km = M\{m} be the set M without agent m. Also let Jk = Km\{k} denote
a set Km without agent k and Σk =
P
j∈Jkpjn. We shall use the following
star condition:
For all m ∈ M, k ∈ Km: Either pmn > pmk or [pmn < pmk,
pmn > pmkpkn, and (pmn−pmkpkn)Σk > (pmk −pmn)+pkn(pmk −pmn)].
Proposition 3: Given c ∈ (0,1), there exists a threshold probability
δ ∈ (0,1) such that the outward pointing star is Nash if :
1. pij ∈ (δ,1) for all pairs ij.
2. The star condition holds.
Proof: Consider the outward pointing star with agent n as the central
agent. Choose the threshold probability δ ∈ (c,1) to satisfy the inequality
maxm∈M

(1 − pnm) +








 < c (2)
if pij ∈ (δ,1) for all ij. Next we identify the conditions under which no
player wants to deviate. We know that n has no links to sever, and does
not want to add a link since gmn = 1 for all m ∈ M and the ﬂow of beneﬁts
is two-way. Now consider an agent m 6= n who might wish to sever the
link with n and instead link with some other k ∈ Km. Player m’s payoﬀ
from the outward pointing star is Πm(got) = pmn + pmn
P
k∈Kmpkn − c. His
payoﬀ from deviating and forming the new link is Πm(got − gmn + gmk) =
pmk + pmkpkn + pmkpknΣkpjn − c. We get Πi(got) − Πi(got − gin + gik) =
(pmn −pmk)+pkn(pmn −pmk)+(pmn −pmkpkn)Σk. This is clearly positive
when pmn > pmk for all m ∈ M, i.e., when every non-central agent (i 6= n)
has her best link with the central agent .
However, when the inequality is reversed, we need pmn > pmkpkn and
(pmn −pmkpkn)Σk > (pmk −pmn)+pkn(pmk −pmn), i.e., agent k’s link with
n is so weak that it is not worthwhile for m to form this link. Essentially,
13the diﬀerence between the beneﬁts from accessing agents j ∈ Jk through n
instead of the indirect link through k in this case should exceed net beneﬁts
from agents n and k when agent m establishes a link with k instead of the
central agent. Note that player m can only sever one link in an outward
pointing star and hence we need not consider any more instances of link
substitution by player m.
Next we need to check that no agent wants to add an extra link. This
means that no m ∈ M wants to form a link with any k ∈ Km. Note that
payoﬀs with this additional link are bounded above by (n−1)−2c. Taking
the diﬀerence between Πm(got +gmk) and Πm(got) we get [(1−pmn)+(1−
p1npmn)+···+(1−pm−1npmn)+(1−pm+1npmn)+···+(1−pn−1npmn)] < c as
the condition that the additional link is lowering m’s payoﬀ. Verifying that
this is satisﬁed for all m ∈ M, gives us maxm∈M[(1−pmn)+(1−p1npmn)+
··· + (1 − pm−1npmn) + (1 − pm+1npmn) + ··· + (1 − pn−1npmn)] < c, which
is equivalent to (2). Since we use the upper bound on the payoﬀs to show
that it is not worthwhile to add even one extra link by any player m ∈ M,
this obviates the need to check that a player may want to add more than
one link.
Compared to the Bala and Goyal framework, the introduction of hetero-
geneous agents alters the situation signiﬁcantly. While part of the diﬀerence
involves more complex conditions for establishing any star network, hetero-
geneity comes with its own reward. A diﬀerent probability for the success of
each link resolves the coordination problem implicit in the Bala and Goyal
framework. For a constant probability of success, once one identiﬁes condi-
tions under which a given star network will be Nash, the role of the central
agent can be assigned to any player. With heterogeneous agents, however,
there are some natural candidates for the central agent. The agent who has
the least beneﬁt net of costs from a single link, is the natural choice for
the central agent in the outward pointing star. There are some other diﬀer-
ences from the Bala and Goyal framework. Notice that the determination
of δ involves probabilities of all other links, making it quite complicated.
Further, the beneﬁts from deviation are also altered now. In the Bala and
Goyal framework, no agent in the outward pointing star will ever deviate
by severing a link with the central agent. In our model, links to the central
agent will be severed unless the probabilities in the relevant range satisfy
some additional conditions.
Note that in our framework the inward pointing star is Nash in the above
speciﬁed range of costs if the central agent’s worst link yields higher bene-
14ﬁts than c and (2) is satisﬁed. Clearly, the role of the central agent for this
star can be assigned to the agent whose payoﬀ net of costs from forming
the (n − 1) links is the highest. The mixed star can be supported as Nash
when conditions required by the inward and the outward pointing star are
satisﬁed for the relevant agents.
Next let us consider the case where c > 1. Here c > pij for all links gij.
We provide conditions under which the outward pointing star is Nash.
Proposition 4: Given c ∈ (1,n−1) there exists a threshold probability
δ < 1 such that for pij ∈ (δ,1) the outward pointing star is Nash.
Proof: Let agent n be the center with whom all the other players estab-
lish links. Since c ∈ (1,n−1) we can choose δ ∈ (0,1) such that if pij ∈ (δ,1)
for all ij, then (2) holds and minm∈M[pmn(1 +
P
k∈Kmpkn)] > c. Then no
m ∈ M wants to sever his link with n. The remainder of the proof is similar
to the proof of Proposition 3.
Once again it is possible to identify a natural candidate for the role of
the central player. Also, note that the inward pointing and mixed star will
never be Nash within this range of costs.
3.4 Eﬃciency Issues
Eﬃciency is a key issue in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Bala and Goyal
(2000a,b), and Johnson and Gilles (2000). When costs are very high or very
low, or when links are highly reliable, there is virtually no conﬂict between
Nash networks and eﬃciency in the Bala and Goyal (2000b) framework.
This observation still holds in our context. However, there is a conﬂict
between Nash networks and eﬃciency for intermediate ranges of costs and
link reliability, even with the same probability of link failure for all links.
In particular, Nash networks may be under-connected relative to the social
optimum as the subsequent example shows.
Let us add two important observations not made before. First, it is
possible that Nash networks are nested and Pareto-ranked. Second, at least
in our context, the following can coexist: a Nash network which is not
eﬃcient, but Pareto-optimal and a unique eﬃcient network which is not
Nash and does not weakly Pareto-dominate the Nash network. The ﬁrst
observation is supported by the following example: c = 1, n = 4 and pij =
0.51 for all ij. In this case, both the empty network and the outward
15pointing star with center 4 are Nash networks. The “outward pointing star”
consisting of the links 14, 24 and 34 contains and strictly Pareto-dominates
the empty network. Moreover, the empty network is under-connected. Our
second observation is based on the following example, depicted in Figure 2.
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FIGURE 2: Ineﬃcient and Pareto Nash Network
Example 1: c = 1, n = 7. p16 = p26 = p37 = p47 = p = 0.6181,
p56 = a = 0.2, p67 = b = 0.3, and corresponding probabilities for the
symmetric links. All other links have probabilities pij < p0. Now g given by
g16 = g26 = g37 = g47 = 1 and gij = 0 otherwise is a Nash network. Indeed,
p is barely large enough to make this a Nash network. The critical value for
p satisﬁes p(1+p) = 1 with solution 0.6180.... But g is not eﬃcient. Linking
also 5 with 6 and 6 with 7 provides the following added beneﬁts where we
use 2p = 1.2362 and 1 + 2p = 2.2362:
For 1+2: 1.2362 · (a + b · 2.2362) = 1.07656
For 3+4: 1.2362 · b · (a + 2.2362) = 0.90349
For 5: a · 2.2362 + ab · 2.2362 = 0.58141
For 6: a + b · 2.2362 = 0.87086
For 7: b · (a + 2.2362) = 0.73086
Total: 4.16318
Hence the total added beneﬁt exceeds the cost of establishing these two
additional links. The network thus created would be eﬃcient. But neither 6
nor 7 beneﬁts enough from the additional link between them to cover the cost
of the link. Thus, the enlarged eﬃcient network is not Nash. Since the rules
of the game stipulate that one of the two agents assumes the entire cost of the
new link, the enlarged eﬃcient network cannot weakly Pareto-dominate g. In
fact, g is Pareto-optimal while ineﬃcient. Reconciling eﬃciency and Pareto-
optimality would require the possibility of cost sharing and side payments.
163.5 Existence of Nash Equilibria
The existence of Nash networks (or of pairwise stable networks) has not been
systematically explored in the literature. Jackson and Watts (2002a) provide
an example for non-existence of pairwise stable networks. Jackson (2003)
shows existence of pairwise stable networks for several prominent allocation
rules. Bala and Goyal (2000a) outline a constructive proof of the existence
of Nash networks under perfect reliability. In addition, the literature con-
tains assertions that for certain parameter ranges, the model admits Nash
networks (or pairwise stable networks, respectively) with speciﬁc properties.
If the various regions happen to cover the entire parameter space, then as
a by-product, existence has been shown for the particular model. This is
the case for n = 3 in the model of Bala and Goyal (2000b). If the various
regions do not cover the entire parameter space, existence remains an open
question for some parameter constellations. We going to show that when
links have diﬀerent success probabilities, a Nash network may not exist, i.e.,
heterogeneity can lead to non-existence of Nash equilibria.
Example 2: Let there be a total of 83 agents labelled i = 0,1,2,3,301,
...,363,4,401,...,415. Set
p = p12 = p21 = 0.4;
q = p23 = p32 = 0.01473;
r = p34 = p43 = 1/32;
s = p14 = p41 = 1/16;
t = p20 = p02 = 1.
Further put
p3j = pj3 = 1 forj = 301,...,363;
p4j = pj4 = 1 forj = 401,...,415;
pij = pji = 0 for all remaining ij.
Finally, choose c = 0.95. Then the following links will always be established:
02 or 20;
3j or j3 for j = 301,...,363;
4j or j4 for j = 401,...,415.
Obviously, none of the links ij with pij = 0 will be established. Moreover,
1 will always establish the link 14, 4 will always establish the link 43, 2 will
never establish the link 21 and 3 will never establish the link 32. Now the
17existence of a Nash network can be decided by assessing the beneﬁts from
links 12 and 23 to players 1 and 2, respectively, given that all other links
have been established or not according to our foregoing account. We obtain:
• Without 23, player 1 strictly prefers not to establish 12.
• With 23, player 1 strictly prefers to establish 12.
• Without 12, the beneﬁt to player 2 from link 23 is 0.95011 and estab-
lishing 23 is a strict best response.
• With 12, player 2’s beneﬁt from link 23 is reduced by 81pqrs = 0.00093
(due to redundancies) and not establishing 23 is a strict best response.
Hence there are no mutual best responses regarding establishment of 12 and
23. Consequently, a Nash network does not exist.
To understand why the particular choice of q has player 2 switch back
and forth, replace q by a e q such that without 12, player 2 is indiﬀerent
between having and not having the link 23, i.e. e q·(64+r·16+rs) = c. This
yields e q = 0.014728236. Then with 12, player 2 would not want the link
because of redundancies. By continuity, q slightly larger than e q produces
the best response properties exhibited above.
4 Alternative Model Speciﬁcations
In this section we will consider four alternative speciﬁcations of our current
model. The ﬁrst variation introduces greater realism in the formation of
networks by allowing agents to duplicate existing links, thereby raising link
success probabilities. The second speciﬁcation considers network formation
under incomplete information. Here, each agent i ∈ N is aware of the success
probabilities pij,i 6= j of her own links, but is ignorant of the probabilities
of link successes of the other agents. Further, we discuss the implications
for Nash networks when pairwise link formation requires the consent of
the other agent. Finally, we examine Nash networks with endogenous link
success probabilities.
4.1 An Alternative Formulation of Network Reliability
The payoﬀ function in the previous section is based on the closure of the
network implying that the links gij = 1 and gji = 1 are perfectly correlated.
18Thus, no agent will ever duplicate a link if it already exists. An alterna-
tive way of modelling information ﬂows would be to assume that the events
gij = 1 and gji = 1 are independent. This captures the idea that if both
agents involved in a relationship form the link, it will succeed with a higher
probablity. Then a direct link between i and j is in eﬀect with probability
rij = 1 − (1 − pij)2 if gij + gji = 2, with probability pij if gij + gji = 1, and
zero probability if gij +gji = 0. Notice that rij > pij for pij ∈ (0,1). There-
fore, under certain circumstances, there exists an incentive for a double link
between agents i and j. This never occurs in the previous model since dupli-
cating a link can only increase costs. We examine the implications of such
double links while retaining the assumption that pij = pji. Also, the ﬂow of
beneﬁts is still both ways. Potential new links can lead to new equilibria over
a range of costs and probabilities. They may leave the original equilibrium
unaltered or destroy it. The next example demonstrates several possibilities.
Example 3: Let n = 3. First consider the following probabilities and
costs: p12 = 0.8, p23 = 0.9 and c = 0.7. All other link probabilities are zero
or close to zero. Let g1 ≡ (g21 = g23 = 1). It is easy to verify that this simple
center sponsored star is Nash since player 2 does not wish to break any links.
Now suppose we allow for double links. It is easy to verify that the original
center sponsored star remains Nash. With the current numerical speciﬁca-
tion, in any network involving double links, one of the agents contributing
to a double link is better oﬀ breaking it. Next consider the case where
p12 = 0.5, p23 = 0.3 and c = 0.2, with all other probabilities being zero.
Once again when no double links are permitted the network g1 is Nash. In
contrast to the previous case, it is easy to verify that when double links are
allowed, the equilibrium architecture is given by g12 = g21 = 1 = g23 = g32.
Finally, consider the case where p12 = 0.5, p23 = 0.3 and c = 0.22, with all
other probabilities being zero. The center sponsored star is still Nash under
the single link model. Once we allow for double links however, it is easy to
verify that the Nash network is given by g12 = g21 = g32 = 1 with all other
links being inactive.
The incremental reliability of a double link is given by rij−pij = pij−p2
ij
which is maximized at pij = 0.5. Double links are not proﬁtable when link
costs exceed incremental beneﬁts, which is most likely to occur when the
probabilities are very high or low. This is exactly what happens with the
ﬁrst set of p and c parameters in the example. In the second numerical
speciﬁcation, players 1 and 3 gain from adding double links to the original
network architecture, that is the incremental beneﬁts provided by the double
19links strictly outweigh the costs, and link costs are suﬃciently low so that
2 wants to keep both his links. In the last numerical speciﬁcation, creation
of the link 32 is beneﬁcial for 3, but reduces the beneﬁt of the prior link 23
for 2 from p23 = 0.3 to r23 − p23 = 0.21 which is less than its cost. Hence
in response to the establishment of link 32, the prior link 23 is dropped.
From the example, it should also be evident that this formulation can lead
to super-connected networks of a diﬀerent sort − where agents may reinforce
existing higher probability links instead of creating new links to players with
whom they are not yet directly linked.
Observe that when double links are possible the earlier terminology of
inward and outward pointing stars is not very helpful at times. For instance,
using our old deﬁnitions it is not possible to describe the third equilibrium
architecture in Example 2. We deﬁne a degree two star as a star network
where every peripheral agent has a link with the central agent and the cen-
tral agent has a link with each peripheral agent. This star combines the
inward and outward pointing stars. Clearly, the deﬁnition of a mixed star
also takes a new meaning now, since a mixed star can include both double
links and single links that are initiated by either the central or a peripheral
agent. Similarly, we can deﬁne a degree two connected network as a
connected network where all links are double links. In a mixed connected
network, both double and single links exist. Also, the degree two com-
plete network is the complete network where every pair of agents has a
double link between them. This allows us to obtain the analogue of Propo-
sition 2. To begin with, a version of Proposition 1 also holds under this
alternative formulation.
Remark 1 (Proposition 10): If pij ≥ 1
1+c/n2 rmk for any i 6= j and
m 6= k, then every Nash network is either empty or connected.
The proof resembles the previous proof, while allowing for the possibility
that there is a double link between i and j. The condition on success prob-
abilities implies for uniform success probability p that p ≥ 1 − c/n2 which
in turn implies p − p2 < p0(n,c). This means that double links are not
worth initiating and, consequently, connected Nash networks are essential
although double links are allowed. Example 3 illustrates that for speciﬁc
parameter constellations, Nash networks are connected with some or all
links duplicated. Further, a version of Proposition 2 continues to hold. Let
again P = [pij] denote the matrix of link success probabilities for all agents
20(i,j) ∈ N × N where pij ∈ (0,1).
Remark 2 (Proposition 20): For any P, there exists c(P) > 0 such that
the degree two complete network is (strict) Nash for all c ∈ (0,c(P)). The
empty network is strict Nash for c > max{pij}.
With regard to the second part, the possibility of double links does not
alter the fact that if c > max{pij} and no other agent forms a link, then it
will not be worthwhile for agent i to form a link. For the ﬁrst part, the proof
relies on a continuity argument and is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.
For n = 3 and a uniform success probability p ∈ [1/4,1), one can show that
if the degree two complete network is Nash, then the essential complete net-
works are not Nash. For instance, for c = 0.25 and p = 0.71727, the wheel
with links 12, 23, 31 is Nash and, consequently, the degree two complete
network cannot be Nash. In general, it is an open question whether other
complete Nash networks can coexist with the degree two complete network.
Example 3 oﬀers three cases where the only Nash network is connected but
not complete, where all, some, or none of the links are double links.
The consequences of the new formulation (eﬀective double links) are now
further explored by reexamining Proposition 3. The incentives for modify-
ing links by deviating do not change under this formulation, i.e., the “star
condition” of Proposition 3 is assumed to hold. The main impact of the
double link model is on the threshold probability value δ, altering the range
of costs and probabilities under which the outward pointing star can be sup-
ported as Nash. Note that the payoﬀ function used earlier for determining
the payoﬀ from an additional link gets around this issue by assuming that
payoﬀs have an upper bound of (n−1)−αc where α denotes the number of
links formed. In order to see how this new formulation will aﬀect reliability
we need to compute the precise value of the payoﬀs from additional links
instead of using the upper bound. We denote the resulting new threshold
value by e δ. We ﬁnd that a threshold of the form
e δ = maxm∈Mmaxi6=mδm
i
will suﬃce. Each δm
i is a threshold value related to the speciﬁc link mi.
21Proposition 5: Suppose that the links gij = 1 and gji = 1 are indepen-
dent, and c ∈ (0,1). Then there exists a threshold probability e δ ∈ (0,1)such
that the outward pointing star is Nash if :
1. pij ∈ (e δ,1) for all pairs ij.
2. The star condition holds.
Proof: See Appendix.
In our previous formulation, δ can also be obtained as the maximum of
link-speciﬁc thresholds. The latter tends to be lower if duplication has no
beneﬁts. Thus, in general e δ > δ. To see why this is the case let pij = p for
all ij ∈ N ×N. Then p > δ is equivalent to (i) (1−p)+(1−(n−2)p2) < c.
On the other hand, p > e δ is equivalent to (ii) p(1−p2)+(n−2)(1−p)p2 < c
plus (iii) p(1 − p) + (1 − p)(n − 2)p2 < c. Now p = 1 − c satisﬁes (i) if
n ≥ 2 + 1/(1 − c)2, but violates (ii) and (iii) for suﬃciently large n. Hence
given c, one obtains e δ > δ for suﬃciently large n. Such is the case for
c = 1/2,n = 10. Moreover, based on the example provided above, it is also
obvious that a whole range of mixed stars may arise as equilibria.
4.2 Nash Networks under Incomplete Information
The previous sections have assumed that the agents are fully aware of all
link success probabilities. However, this is not always a very realistic as-
sumption. As an alternative, we now introduce incomplete information in
the game. Each agent i ∈ N has knowledge of the probability of success of
all her direct links. However, she is not aware of the probability of success
of indirect links, i.e., agent i knows the value of pij, but is unaware of the
value of pjk, where i 6= j,k. The assumption that pij = pji is still retained.
We re-examine Proposition 3 for this speciﬁcation.
In order to solve for the equilibrium networks, each agent i must now
have some beliefs about indirect links. We assume each agent postulates
that, on average, every other agent’s world is identical to her own. She as-
signs the average success value of all her own direct links to the indirect links,
imparting a symmetry to the problem of indirect links. Thus, agent i assigns
a value of pi = 1
n−1
P
i6=m pim to all indirect links pjk for i 6= j,k. This has
some immediate consequences for the payoﬀ function. Consider some agent
m ∈ M. This agent now believes that her payoﬀ from the outward pointing
star is given by Πm(got) = pnm+|Km|pnmpm−c = pnm+(n−2)pnmpm−c,
22which is clearly diﬀerent from her actual payoﬀ. We obtain the modiﬁed
star condition by replacing each term pnk with pm. Let δ be the probabil-
ity threshold of Proposition 3.
Proposition 6: Given each agent’s beliefs about her indirect links, the
outward pointing star is Nash if:
1. pij ∈ (δ,1) for all pairs ij.
2. The modiﬁed star condition holds.
3. (n − 2)(1 − pnmpm) < ((n − 2) − pnm
P
k∈Km pnk) for all m ∈ M.
Proof: See Appendix.
This formulation provides us with some interesting insights about the
role of the indirect links and the vulnerability of Nash networks. First ob-
serve that the set of conditions for the outward pointing star to be Nash
are very similar to those in Proposition 3. However, there are some dif-
ferences. For the purpose of comparison, let us assume that the actual
probabilities satisfy the hypothesis of Proposition 3. It is possible that
1 − pnm + (n − 2)(1 − pnmpm) > c > 1 − pnm + ((n − 2) − pnm
P
k∈Km pnk),
in which case agents will create new links destroying the star architecture.
Consequently, the realized network yields lower payoﬀs than the star net-
work. This is one of the crucial diﬀerences arising from this formulation.
While the outward star is Nash under complete information, agents create
additional links under incomplete information because of incorrect beliefs
about indirect links. Thus, the introduction of incomplete information can
easily lead to network failure, in the sense that the outcome is less eﬃcient
than it would be otherwise.
We now examine additional consequences of this formulation through an
explicit example.
Example 4: Consider a network with n = 6. Suppose agents 1 to 4
are linked in a star formation with agent 4 being the central agent, i.e.,
g14 = g24 = g34 = 1. Further g56 = 1 and we will examine what happens
to the link g45 under complete and incomplete information. Let c = 1/12,
p14 = p24 = p34 = p = 4/10, p56 = r = 1/2 and p45 = q = 1/24. The
probabilities of all other links are assumed to be zero.
23Under these objective probabilities it is easy to verify that q(1 + r) < c
and hence agent 4 will never initiate the link with agent 5. However, agent
5 will initiate this link since q(1+3p) > c. The resulting connected network
is Nash since all other links yield no beneﬁts.
Note that for our current formulation with incomplete information, p5 =
r = 1
5(r + q) and p4 = p = 1
5(3p + q). Under these beliefs about the
probabilities of the indirect links, agent 4 will never establish the link since
q(1+r) < c. Similarly, agent 5 will not establish the link since q(1+3p) < c.
With incomplete information the above disconnected network with g45 = 0
is a Nash network.
Thus incomplete information may destroy a crucial link and give rise to
two connected components. In this section we demonstrate that incomplete
information as modelled here can either lead to new links yielding lower
payoﬀs or destroy crucial links in the network. There are other interesting
alternatives to introduce incomplete information into a strategic model of
network formation. Speciﬁcally, McBride (2002) considers a model with
fully reliable links, but with incomplete information about the existence of
certain indirect links and incomplete information about the beneﬁts which
accrue to a player via each of her direct links. He employs a generalized
conjectural equilibrium concept.
4.3 Mutual Consent
This subsection explores the role of consent in Nash networks. In our set-
ting and in much of the literature, it is assumed that agent i does not need
the consent of agent j to initiate a link from i to j. All it takes is that
agent i incurs the cost c. This could be construed as a drawback of the
non-cooperative formulation. However, one might argue that when asked
agent j might give her permission anyway, since she will only beneﬁt from
an additional link that does not cost her anything.5 Thus introducing an
implicit consent requirement seems inconsequential, a descriptive improve-
ment at best, a notational burden at worst. Yet Nash networks have an-
other more serious weakness. Namely, it seems somewhat preposterous that
agent j should divulge all the information from her other links without even
requiring her consent. For this reason, we now discuss the implications
of a consent game. Formally, such a requirement can be accommodated
by replacing each player’s strategy set Gi by Gi × Gi with generic elements
5This argument is less compelling in the case of one-way information ﬂow.
24(gi,ai) = (gi1,...,gii−1,gii+1,...,gin;ai1,...,aii−1,aii+1,...,ain) where the
second component, ai, stands for i’s consent decisions. A link from i to j is
initiated by mutual consent if and only if gij = 1 and aji = 1. Agents incur
only the cost of links that are permitted. Denied links are absolutely costless.
Every graph g that was a Nash network before is still a Nash network.
But now there is room for mutual obstruction: gij = 0 is always a best
response to aji = 0 and vice versa. Therefore, the empty network is always
Nash under a mutual consent requirement. In addition, for any N0 ⊆ N,
the Nash networks with reduced player set N0 give rise to Nash networks of
the network formation game requiring mutual consent with player set N, if
one adds the agents in N \ N0 as isolated nodes. Furthermore, take any set
of potential edges E ⊆ N × N and replace pij by qij < p0 for all ij ∈ E
in the original model. Any Nash network of the thus deﬁned hypothetical
game constitutes a Nash network of the network formation game requiring
mutual consent.
But how robust are these new equilibria? Note that one could modify
the mutual consent game by requiring that agents must incur the cost of
all links they initiate, regardless of consent. Since agents are rational and
have complete information, links that will be denied will never be initiated
in equilibrium. Hence the Nash networks will be identical under this spec-
iﬁcation. However, all the new equilibria from the mutual consent game
will be eliminated, if one imposes 2-player coalition-proofness or introduces
conjectural variations of the kind that a player interested in initiating a link
presumes the other’s consent. A more serious issue is why two agents cannot
split the cost in a Pareto-improving way when both would beneﬁt from an
additional link. Addressing endogenous cost sharing in a satisfactory way
necessitates a radically diﬀerent approach which is beyond the scope of the
present generation of models.
The Jackson-Wolinsky “connections model” assumes exogenous cost shar-
ing. In such a case, agent i can have an incentive to reject a link from j to
i. More generally, one can consider a modiﬁcation of the payoﬀ function (1)
that yields the expanded form







where i incurs the cost or disutility c0, if he agrees to a link initiated by agent
j. The quantity c0 can be interpreted as a composite cost which includes
25an explicit cost contribution towards the creation of a link ji as well as
a certain disutility (negative externality) that i experiences when others
contact him through this link.6 The special case c = c0 is tantamount to
equal cost sharing. While we leave the detailed analysis of reliability issues in
this framework for future research, three observations can be made without
further scrutiny. First, if giving one’s consent is costly, Nash networks tend
to be smaller, a ﬁnding echoed by Gilles and Sarangi (2003) for the full
reliability case. This would still be true, if we allowed for the additional
possibility that at an extra cost, agent j can impose the link ji against
i’s objection. Second, the possibility of mutual obstruction persists under
costly consent. Gilles and Sarangi (2003) show that for arbitrary network
payoﬀ functions, any equilibrium in a model with two-sided costs of link
formation is also an equilibrium in a model with one-sided costs like the
model developed in this paper. The reverse however is not true. It is easy
to see that this observation holds for our model as well. Third, since the
empty network is always Nash with a mutual consent requirement, existence
is no longer an issue. In Example 2, a non-trivial equilibrium is possible as
well, if mutual consent is required. Namely, g12 = a21 = 0,g23 = a32 = 1 are
the crucial components of a Nash equilibrium where link 23 is formed and
link 12 is not formed.
4.4 Endogenous Link Probabilities
In this subsection, we consider the possibility that the addition of a link ren-
ders all adjacent links less reliable. For conceivably, any given node might
become less eﬀective in responding to information requests via its direct
links, if it gets accessed through one more direct link. In other words, the
additional link causes a negative externality on the other links competing for
access to the same node. Incorporating this particular feature into a model
of network formation leads to endogenous failure probabilities. One of the
consequences is that a complete network need no longer be Nash, even if
links are costless. To illustrate this and other interesting possibilities, let us
consider
6In a more reﬁned version, one could diﬀerentiate the cost structure further and make
the cost of accepting a speciﬁc link ji depend on whether or not there is duplication, that
is the reverse link ij is initiated by i and accepted by j.
26Example 5: Negative link externalities.
Let c = 0. For i ∈ N and g ∈ G, set
ni(g) = |{k ∈ N \ {i} : gik = 1 or gki = 1}|,
the number of agents to whom i has direct links in g. For any two agents i
and j and any network g, let the endogenous probability of success of link





nj(g), if gij + gji > 0;
0, if gij + gji = 0.
First consider the case n = 3 and the wheel or circle g with links 12, 23,
and 31, an essential complete network where each link has success proba-
bility 1/4. Each player i receives payoﬀ Πi(g) = 19/32. After severance of
the link initiated by him, the two remaining links have each success proba-
bility 1/2 and i’s payoﬀ becomes 3/4 or 24/32. This shows our claim that
with endogenous success probabilities and zero or negligible costs, complete
networks need no longer be Nash — in stark contrast to Proposition 2. More-
over, for n ≥ 4, wheels with simple links, line networks with simple links,
and stars are not Nash under the current assumptions. Regarding stars, a
peripheral agent gains from initiating links to other peripheral agents in ad-
dition to the existing link to the central agent. Finally, the example exhibits
non-empty Nash networks with very small connected components. It turns
out that a network g is Nash if each component C either satisﬁes |C| = 3
and is incomplete (is not a wheel) or satisﬁes |C| = 2.
This somewhat extreme example clearly shows that the negative exter-
nality caused by additional links can aﬀect the outcomes signiﬁcantly. Next
let us consider a more general model of endogenous success probabilities.
It encompasses the case of capacity constraints where an agent or node i
cannot have or handle more than Li links.
We assume Pij = Pji ∈ (0,1] for i 6= j and a non-increasing function
αi : I N → [0,1] with αi(1) = 1 for each agent. Then the endogenous success
probabilities are given by
pij(g) =
(
αi(ni(g))αj(nj(g))Pij, if gij + gji > 0;
0, if gij + gji = 0.
27In Example 5, αi(z) = 1/z. Another example is given by capacity con-
straints L1,...,Ln where the Li are positive integers. For this case αi(z) = 1
for z ≤ Li and αi(z) = 0 for z > Li. The following obvious proposition con-
ﬁrms the conclusions drawn from Example 5.
Proposition 7: If (n−1)αi(n−1) < c1/2 for all i, then no star network
can be Nash.
In the case of capacity constraints, suppose c ∈ (0,1) and Pij = p ∈
(0,1). Then the existence of star Nash networks depends on the severity of
the capacity constraints.
Proposition 8: There exists p(c) ∈ (c,1) such that for p ∈ (p(c),1):
(i) If for all i, Li < n − 1, then no star network is Nash.
(ii) If for some i, Li ≥ n − 1, then all stars with center i are Nash.
Proof: By Proposition 3.2(b) of Bala and Goyal (2000b), there exists
p(c) ∈ (c,1) such for p ∈ (p(c),1), all star networks are Nash in the absence
of capacity constraints. If Li < n − 1 and i is the center of a star, then
pij = 0 for all j 6= i and an agent is better oﬀ severing a link to or from i.
Hence (i). If Li ≥ n−1 and i is the center of a star, then pij = p for all j 6= i
and the star remains Nash after the imposition of the capacity constraints.
Hence (ii).
The foregoing example and the two propositions suggest that negative
link externalities expressed in terms of endogenous success probabilities tend
to destabilize some of the prominent network architectures. However, novel
and equally interesting Nash networks may arise as the following example
illustrates.
Example 6. Let n = 4, c = 0.35, P1j = Pj1 = 0.8 for j 6= 1, and Pij = 0.5
for all other links. With exogenous probabilities pij = Pij, all stars with
center 1 are Nash, whereas the wheel with links 12,23,34,41 is not Nash
because 1 gains from establishing the extra diagonal link 13. Now assume en-
dogenous probabilities and αi(1) = αi(2) = 1 for all i. Then for suﬃciently
small values of αi(3) and αi(4), the stars cease to be Nash and the above
wheel becomes Nash. This shows that network externalities may destabilize
certain prominent network architectures and help support others.
28The approach taken here has provided several immediate and important
insights. The asymptotic behavior of the network (as n increases) crucially
depends, among things, on the properties of the functions (n−1)αi(n−1).
Again, super-connectivity may or may not occur. Under certain circum-
stances, connected multi-hub systems can emerge.
The present approach can be generalized in several ways. The multi-
plicative form αiαj incorporates both some degree of substitutability and
some degree of complementarity between nodes. The additive form αi +αj,
after suitable normalization, would reﬂect perfect substitutability and the
form max{αi,αj} perfect complementarity. Hence a richer model of endoge-
nous probabilities remains to be investigated.
Goyal and Joshi (2003), in a model with full reliability, but more gen-
eral utility functions, view the role of externalities in link formation from a
diﬀerent angle. They focus on how the marginal beneﬁt of an extra link is
aﬀected by the number of links of the agent or the number of links of other
agents. In our context, with imperfect reliability and exogenous success
probabilities, an increase of the number of direct links to or from an agent
typically decreases and never increases the agent’s marginal beneﬁt from a
direct link. The eﬀects of additional links by other agents can be of either
sign, both with exogenous and endogenous success probabilities. Therefore,
some but by no means all numerical speciﬁcations of our model will ﬁt into
the Goyal and Joshi classiﬁcation.
5 Concluding Remarks
The model developed here as well as a substantial part of the network liter-
ature is concerned with information ﬂows. Such models may be interpreted
as a reduced form where all costs and beneﬁts have been attributed to in-
formation ﬂows. Under perfect reliability, the primary focus lies on the size
and eﬃciency of networks. With imperfect reliability the strength of social
ties, or the nature and quality of information can be discussed as well. In
our model for instance, one could argue that the information exchange be-
tween i and j is valuable with probability pij and is of a dubious nature with
the complementary probability. Thus, imperfect reliability raises questions
about a possible quantity-quality trade-oﬀ as well as the related eﬃciency
issues.
29The assumption of agent heterogeneity in the form of imperfect reliabil-
ity in social networks provides a richer set of results than the homogeneous
setting. In conjunction with our adopted solution concept, Nash equilib-
rium, it accentuates open questions that also arise − though perhaps to a
lesser degree − in the context of pairwise stability. An example is the issue
of cost sharing and side payments. Twice in the course of our current inves-
tigation we came across this issue: First, in the discussion of eﬃciency and
Pareto-optimality. For a second time in the context of the mutual consent
model. The issue of cost sharing and bargaining over the costs of link forma-
tion is especially crucial when beneﬁts mainly accrue from indirect links. It
indicates an important direction for future research. Currarini and Morelli
(2000) take a ﬁrst step in this direction. They introduce a noncooperative
game of sequential network formation in which players propose links and de-
mand payoﬀs. They show that for networks which satisfy size monotonicity,
there is no conﬂict between eﬃciency and stability.
Bala and Goyal’s work on Nash networks shows that results under im-
perfect reliability are quite diﬀerent from those in a deterministic setting.
With the introduction of heterogeneity this clear distinction no longer pre-
vails. Our ﬁndings encompass results of both types of models. For example,
with perfect reliability and information decay, non-empty Nash networks
are always minimally connected, irrespective of the size of society (Bala and
Goyal (2000a)). In contrast, with homogeneous imperfect reliability and no
information decay, redundant links between agents always arise asymptoti-
cally (Bala and Goyal (2000b)). In our model, with heterogeneous imperfect
reliability and no information decay, both types of outcomes can be gener-
ated through appropriate choice of the pij’s. For instance, decay models
(with perfect reliability) compute beneﬁts by considering only the shortest
path between agents. Extra indirect links do not contribute to beneﬁts.
Given a resulting minimally connected Nash network g of such a model,
there exists a parameter speciﬁcation of our model that also gives rise to g
as a Nash network. In our framework this requires lowering the pij to zero
or below p0 for all ij with gij = 0 and gji = 0 and choosing suﬃciently high
probabilities pij for all other ij so that all beneﬁts accrue from the direct
links only. On the other hand, as discussed in subsection 3.1, choosing the
pij’s appropriately leads to super-connected networks as well.
The four alternative model speciﬁcations introduced here provide im-
mediate results as well as valuable insights for future work. The double
links model which is the most thoroughly investigated formulation allows
30three important conclusions. First note that double links are not likely to
be established when probabilities are very high or very low. Next notice
that because of the increase in link reliability, certain high link establish-
ment costs can now be surmounted allowing creation of new links. Finally
observe that the nature of super-connected networks changes since agents
might prefer to reinforce high probability links over forming new links. The
second model variation demonstrates that under incomplete information,
some of the previous Nash networks become quite fragile. Our third model
variation clearly indicates that costless mutual consent will only lead to a
larger set of equilibria and trivially guarantees existence of equilibria. It is
evident that consent models must incorporate costly consent to yield further
insights. Our last model speciﬁcation shows that negative link externalities
— which manifest themselves in endogenous success probabilities — can
yield very fragmented Nash networks. They can cause the disappearance of
stars and the emergence of other interesting network architectures.
Finally, to end on a cautionary note, we have indicated the possibility of
network failure in the discussion following Proposition 6. It is only appropri-
ate to mention Greif’s (1994) tale of two historical societies − the Maghribi
traders, with an Islamic culture who shared trading information widely, and
the Genoese traders exemplifying the Latin world, who operated individu-
ally and did not share information amongst each other, relying more on legal
contracts. He argues that the culture and social organization of these two
communities ultimately determined their long-run survival. The Genoese
kept business secrets from each other, improved their contract law and op-
erated through the market. Consequently they ended up with an eﬃcient
society. The Maghribis on the other hand operated through an informal
network where behavior of a single pair of agents aﬀected everyone in the
network. As opposed to the Genoese traders the Maghribis invested con-
siderable time and eﬀort to gather information about their network. Since
one bad link could adversely aﬀect the entire network, the Maghribis of-
ten had to engage in superﬂuous links as well without adequate concern for
eﬃciency. Eﬃciency became a critical issue once new business opportuni-
ties arose in far away lands, where operating through an ethnically based
network became very expensive. In the end these organizational diﬀerences
created by the cultural beliefs of the two societies led to the survival of
the more eﬃcient of the two. Thus social networks may be good substi-
tutes for anonymous markets in certain societies, but the market paired
with the proper infrastructure may be a more eﬃcient institution. In fact
for trade in standardized commodities, a frictionless and informationally ef-
31ﬁcient anonymous market, if feasible, would be best. Some of the trade-oﬀs
between networks and anonymous markets are addressed by Kranton (1996)
who investigates the persistence and coexistence of personalized exchange
arrangements when anonymous market channels are available and would be
more eﬃcient.
6 Appendix: Proofs
1. Proof of Proposition 5:
Consider the outward pointing star. All agents m ∈ M have a link with
the central agent, and the conditions for not deviating from the Nash strat-
egy identiﬁed in Proposition 3 remain unchanged. However, we must also
verify that neither agent n nor any m ∈ M will gain by adding a link. For
all m ∈ M and k ∈ Km we need to compute Πm(got + gmk) which is the
sum of payoﬀs from three diﬀerent terms: the payoﬀ related to player n,
the payoﬀ related to player k, and the payoﬀ from links to all others players
j ∈ Jk.
• The payoﬀ related to player n is given by
r0
nm ≡ pnm(1 − pmkpnk) + (1 − pnm)pmkpnk + pnmpmkpnk.
• The payoﬀ related to player k is given by
r0
mk ≡ pmk(1 − pnmpnk) + (1 − pmk)pnmpnk + pnmpmkpnk.
• Finally, the payoﬀ from all other players is given by r0
nmΣk.
Adding all these up yields




The link mk will not be formed when Πm(got ⊕ gmk) − Πm(got) < 0, or
(1 − pnm)pmkpnk + pmk(1 − pnmpnk) + (1 − pnm)pmkpnkΣk < c. Choose the
threshold probability δm
k as the smallest number such that this inequality
holds, if pij > δm
k for all i 6= j. Regarding agent n, he does not want to form
an additional link with m ∈ M, if
pmn(1 − pmn) < c.
But this condition follows from pnm > δm
n , where δm
n is the smallest number
such that the inequality pnm(1−pnm)+pnm(1−pnm)
P
k∈Kmpnk < c holds.
Finally, set e δ = maxm∈M maxi6=mδm
i . Then if pij ∈ (e δ,1) for all ij, we can
support the outward pointing star as Nash.
322. Proof of Proposition 6:
Consider an outward pointing star. The central agent n plays no role
in this case. Every agent m receives a perceived payoﬀ of Πm(got) = pmn +
(n − 2)pmnpm − c. Consider the possibility that agent m wants to deviate
and form a link with some k ∈ Km. Her payoﬀs from this are given by
Πm(got + gmk − gmn) = pmk + pmkpm + (n − 3)pmk(pm)2 − c. Hence the
condition for no deviation is given by
pmn − pmk + pm(pmn − pmk) + (n − 3)(pmn − pmpmk)pm > 0
which is true when the modiﬁed star condition holds. In order to rule
out additional links, we require that (n − 2)(1 − pnmpm) < ((n − 2) −
pnm
P
k∈Km pnk). Then the analogue of (2) holds if pij ∈ (δ,1) for all ij.
This completes the proof.
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